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ABSTRACT
Personally Identifiable Information (“PII”) has never been more valuable. In today’s networked
world, seemingly trivial facts can be collected, molded into a marketable economic profile, and
transferred in the blink of an eye. To be sure, the commodification of PII allows for provision of
dramatically more efficient and effective services. Yet the potential for privacy abuses is substantial.
What interest does one have in the constellation of facts that defines one’s identity? Is it something
one can own, like their right of publicity? Or are others free to use what they learn about a person?
This article surveys current privacy law and policy across jurisdictions with a view to providing both
positive and normative answers to these increasingly important questions.
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THE OWNERSHIP AND EXPLOITATION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY IN THE NEW
MEDIA AGE
THOMAS HEMNES*

INTRODUCTION
The lay person thinks of property in binary terms: a thing is mine or it is not.
This probably stems from a very primitive, tactile sense of possession—if it’s in my
hand, I’ve got control over the thing and I can prevent you from using it, which
makes it mine.1 Among children, disputes over ownership are resolved this way, and
a tug of war resolves ownership by resolving possession. For a child, possession is
ten tenths of the law.2
As lawyers, we are trained and accustomed to thinking of property in a
somewhat more nuanced way—as a “bundle of rights.”3 A child’s ownership of a
baseball bat gives her the right to possess it, to autograph it, to burn it, to sell it, to
play baseball with it (subject of course to the rules of the game), but not the right to
hit someone with it or to smash a window with it. Ownership of real estate is even
more constrained by rule, regulation and custom.4 But the binary underpinnings
remain: as to each right in the bundle, either I own it or I don’t; either I have the
right to exclude others from its use or I don’t.5 Some of the rights may be linked;
others may be divisible, but each of them is thought of as mine or not.6 The “bundle
* The author gratefully acknowledges the insights and assistance of Gina Perini, Veronica
Louie, Tristan Walsh and the editorial staff of the John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property
Law in the preparation of this article.
1 See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 100 (Harvard Coll. ed., 2011)
(“The very definition of a property right is a claim ‘good against the world,’ often described as a
‘right to exclude others from the particular legal interest involved . . . .”). I recommend to the reader
Robert Merges’ excellent disquisition. Id.
2 One easily overlooks how potent such memories and images can be in our more adult
conceptions.
3 See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1192 n.150
(1999) (documenting broad use of the “bundle of rights” metaphor in U.S. cases since 1940); VAN
LINDBERG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND OPEN SOURCE 17 (Andy Oram ed., 3d ed. 2008)
(describing property as a collection of independent rights, which “may be individually sold, licensed,
given away, or destroyed”).
4 See Heller, supra note 3, at 1173–74 (1999) (discussing the bevy of modern rules and
regulations affecting real property).
5 See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54
DUKE L.J. 1, 52 (2004) (positing that the right to exclude is the most fundamental property right).
6 John Page, Grazing Rights and Public Lands in New Zealand and the Western United States:
A Comparative Study, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 403, 404–05 (2009) (“This fragmentation allowed
society to treat private property rights as severable, such that the hallmark rights . . . are distinct
‘sticks.’ This notion of property as a divisible and relative bundle of rights has specific resonance in
relation to private rights in public land.”). Of course, there is the possibility of joint ownership,
where two or more persons share ownership as against the rest of the world. See generally United
States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 279–82 (2002) (describing the three principal notions of joint
ownership in U.S. Law).
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of rights” phrase itself calls to mind an image of a bundle of sticks held in the hand,
rather like the arrows held in the claw of the American Eagle. “I’ve got them; they’re
mine; you’re excluded.”
We have even extended this binary conception into the realm of intellectual
property,7 which by its nature is not capable of physical possession.8 By federal
statute, and indeed by the Constitution, patents and copyrights have an owner—the
inventor or author—who holds in his hand the bundle of rights defined by the
statute.9 Those rights fundamentally permit the owner to exclude use by others.10
By common law and state statute, trade secrets are much the same: they are owned
by the person to whom they provide a competitive advantage.11 The only difference is
that they can slip through the owner’s fingers rather easily if they are disclosed
without restriction.12 Patents, copyrights, and trade secrets are capable of joint
ownership,13 but that only means that more than one person or entity is on one side
of the binary line; the whole world is on the other side.
Trademarks are different. In the first place, they cannot be owned “in gross”—
no one can control all uses of a word or symbol;14 the rights of the owner are
necessarily linked to the use to which the mark is put.15 Furthermore, it is said that
trademark law is intended to protect rights of the consumer against confusion as well
as the rights of the provider against misappropriation.16 Ultimately, trademarks are
intended to function as signposts, guiding the consumer to the source of goods or
services.17 Trademark infringement is misdirection18—a harm to the consumer—as
much as it is misappropriation19—a harm to the provider. The law recognizes that
both consumers and producers derive value from trademarks, and therefore attempts
7 LINDBERG, supra note 3, at 17 (applying the “bundle of rights” paradigm to intellectual
property).
8 Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Holding Intellectual Property, 39 GA. L. REV. 1155, 1185 (2005).
9 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (guaranteeing authors and inventors exclusive rights to their
writings and discoveries); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 201; Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO
Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating patent rights initially vest in the inventor).
10 17 U.S.C. § 106; 35 U.S.C. § 271.
11 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939) (“A trade secret may consist of any formula,
pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him
an opportunity to obtain an advantage over his competitors who do not know or use it.”).
12 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (stating that one may
extinguish one’s right to a trade secret either by publicly disclosing it or by failing to take reasonable
measures to maintain its secrecy).
13 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (providing that authors of “a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the
work”); 35 U.S.C. § 116 (“When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall apply
for patent jointly . . . .”).
14 JONATHAN D. ROBBINS, ADVISING EBUSINESSES § 2:40 (2012).
15 See Time, Inc. v. Petersen Publ’g Co., 173 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 1999); 15 U.S.C. § 1125
(2012). Where rights are defined by registration, the registration will be limited to defined uses or
classes and the rights are subject to forfeiture if not actually used within a period of time following
registration. Id. § 1127.
16 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th
ed. 2012); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 781–82 (1992) (explaining
trademarks have a dual purpose to protect consumers and legitimate business interests).
17 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 2:2.
18 Id. § 2:33.
19 Id. § 2:30.
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to balance the interests of both constituencies.20 If one defines property as a bundle
of rights, each of which is capable of ownership as against the world,21 one might
even question whether trademarks should be considered a species of property at
all22—quite ironically, because in many cases (Coca Cola, McDonald’s, Levi’s) they
might be considered the most valuable assets of their putative owners.23
I begin with the question:
can we understand personally identifiable
information (“PII”)24 as property in this context? Does it fall within the binary
ownership framework we apply to patents, copyrights and trade secrets,25 or is PII
more akin to trademarks, where rights are in some sense shared between the original
creator and the world at large?26 There is no doubt that PII has high value,
particularly as it flows through the channels of electronic commerce, and most
particularly as it is pooled into what is dubbed Big Data.27 Ironically, though, we will
see that it attains and holds this value without having become property in any
traditional sense of the word. We will also see that when it is collected to form an

Id. § 2:33
Id. § 2:14
22 See Kenneth L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil
Law System in the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 834 (2000) (claiming it is more convincing
to speak of trademarks as property in civil law jurisdictions than in the United States).
23 See Jacob Siegel Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 327 U.S. 608, 612 (1946) (stating that trade
names are valuable corporate assets).
24 PII is defined variously by the plethora of laws and regulations addressing it. The EU Data
Protection Directive, Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC), defines “personal data” as “any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ("data subject"); an identifiable person is one
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or
to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity. Id. art. 2(a). For purposes of U.S. government agencies, the U.S. Department of Commerce
has published Guide that defines personally identifiable information as “any information about an
individual maintained by an agency, including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or
trace an individual‘s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth,
mother‘s maiden name, or biometric records; and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable
to an individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and employment information.” ERIKA
MCCALLISTER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF
PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) (2010).; see also Personally Identifiable Information
(PII), U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/104256 (last visited Oct. 14,
2012) (defining personally identifiable information as “information that can be used to distinguish or
trace an individual’s identity, either alone or when combined with other personal or identifying
information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual”).
25 See Carrier, supra note 5, at 53 (claiming the bundle of rights theory is predominate).
26 See, e.g., Who, What, Why: In Which Countries Is Coca-Cola Not Sold?, BBC NEWS MAG.
(Sept. 11, 2012, 5:48 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19550067?print=true (describing the
relationship between Coca-Cola and consumers in light of the worldwide recognition of the CocaCola mark).
27 See ANN CAVOUKIAN & JEFF JONAS, INFO. & PRIVACY COMM’R OF ONT., CAN., PRIVACY BY
DESIGN
IN
THE
AGE
OF
BIG
DATA
3
(June
8,
2012),
http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2012/06/pbd-big_data.pdf (warning of the potential for
misuse of personally identifiable information compiled in “big data” systems).
20
21
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image of a person it is not owned by that person at all. In other words, the
playground paradigm for property ownership founders in the realm of New Media.28

I. THE ELEMENTS OF VALUE
One might think of these issues by analogy to a watershed. The vast
aggregations of information that flow through the Internet, the value of which is
pooled and captured along the way in servers and databases that throw off value like
hydroelectric stations, all begin with tiny droplets of information generated by
individuals and their individual transactions. It is worth asking, as to each of these
droplets, what bundle of rights attach to it, and whether anyone “owns” the
individual elements of that bundle.

A. Basic Facts about Individuals
One begins with information that defines who an individual is: name, sex,
address, social security number, date of birth, place of birth, citizenship, telephone
number, and facial and characteristics of appearance.29 Who owns this information?
It would be tempting to say that this information is owned by the particular
individual to which it relates. Such a conception would fit neatly into an intellectual
property scheme in which an original owner licenses or assigns rights to the next
person in the “chain of title” who then licenses or assigns the information
downstream into the large, valuable pools of data that can be exploited for value.30
Reinforcing this conception, companies such as Facebook purport to acknowledge
that their users “own” the personal information they provide.31 This, however, is not
the case. One searches the laws of the United States32 or Europe33 in vain for any
28 See Definition of:
New Media, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/
0,2542,t=new+media&i=47936,00.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2012) (defining new media as “forms of
communicating in the digital world, which includes publishing on CDs, DVDs and, most
significantly, over the Internet[,]” and as “[t]he concept that new methods of communicating in the
digital world allow smaller groups of people to congregate online and share, sell and swap goods and
information”).
29 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Information of this kind is regulated as “personal
information” or “personal data” under the data protection laws of most major jurisdictions. Id.; see
also, e.g., 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.02 (2012); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.80(e) (West 2012).
30 Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the
Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 71 (1996); see also Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal
but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 412
(2003) (noting that the value in something like an individual’s name comes from a third party
collecting and organizing that name among a list of others).
31 See
Information
We
Receive
About
You,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info#usernames (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) (“While
you are allowing us to use the information we receive about you, you always own all of your
information.”).
32 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012) (providing an example of a United States law regarding the
sensitivity of one’s personal information, but not providing for private ownership over that
information). The Privacy Act of 1974 was a very early federal regulation respecting personal
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statute or principle respecting personal identity that is analogous to § 201(a) of the
Copyright Act—“Copyright . . . vests initially in the author . . . .”34—or § 261 of the
Patent Act—“[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property.”35 Nothing in
the law says that you own the fact that you are yourself—your identity.36
The European Personal Data Protection Directive37 (“EU Directive”) is
instructive in this regard. Article 7 provides that personally identifiable data may be
“processed”38 only when one of the following circumstances obtains:
 the data subject has given his consent
 the processing is necessary for the performance of or the entering into a
contract
 processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation
 processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data
subject
 processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the
public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the
controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed
 processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests
pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the
information. Id. It applies only to federal agencies, requiring them to give notice when they collect
personal information, to give individuals access to personal information collected by agencies, and a
right to correct such information when it is incorrect. Id.; see also E-Government Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 (requiring, among other things, federal agencies to develop Privacy
Impact Assessments regarding their collection and retention of personal information).
33 This paper will be largely limited to U.S. and U.K./EU law, although the laws of most
developed countries are analogous.
34 17 U.S.C. § 201.
35 35 U.S.C. § 261.
36 See Mell, supra note 30, at 26–41. Patricia Mell acknowledges this fact, but argues that the
law must extend the concept of property to encompass identity in the form of an electronic persona
or personae. Id. In her view, the “fee simple” in each collection of electronic facts comprising an
image of a person—a persona—should be owned by the individual, forcing others with an interest in
those facts, the government, the public, commercial institutions to bargain with the individual for
rights of use. Id. This is a sweeping and bold assertion, highly protective of the individual, but one
that has not gained traction in the sixteen years since her publication. Identity, however, by its
nature, cannot enjoy the exclusionary rights associated with all forms of property.
37 Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement
of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) [hereinafter EU Directive]. The European Commission
recently proposed amendments to the Directive. Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of
Data Protection Rules to Increase Users’ Control of Their Data and to Cut Costs for Businesses,
PRESS
RELEASES
RAPID
(Jan.
25,
2012),
EUROPA
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/46&format=HTML&aged=0&langua.
ge=en&guiLanguage=en. The proposed amendments are controversial in several respects, and have
been criticized by the United States Department of Commerce. See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INFORMAL
COMMENT ON THE DRAFT GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION AND DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON DATA
PROTECTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATIONS 1 (2012).
38 EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 2(b). For purposes of the EU Directive, “processing”
includes “any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not
by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration,
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction[.]” Id.
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data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by the
interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject39
What is noteworthy for our purposes is that, under the EU Directive,
“processing” personal data, which includes collecting, using and disclosing, is
generally permitted as long as the purpose is “legitimate” and does not violate
“fundamental rights and freedoms.”40 The individual can give her consent, but it is
not required.41 The person collecting and using the personal data, even in the EU,
does not need the individual’s consent to do so.42
An individual thus has no general right to exclude others from knowing basic
elements of her personal identity.43 She does, however, have some control over these
basic elements of personal identity. She can change her address or telephone
number,44 with a bit more difficulty change her name,45 and with considerably more
difficulty change her citizenship or social security number.46 But it is very difficult to
change one’s facial appearance47 and literally impossible to change one’s date and
place of birth or age,48 however much one might want to do so. Under Article 12 of
the EU Directive, the data subject also has the right to access all data processed
about her and the right to demand the rectification, deletion, or blocking of data that
is incomplete, inaccurate, or is not being processed in compliance with the data
protection rules.49 With considerable variation, depending on the jurisdiction of
residence, she can also have certain elements of this information—notably a
telephone number50 or a social security number51—withheld from the public at large.
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 7(f).
41 Id. art. 2(h).
42 Id. art. 7 (providing disjunctive conditions for making data processing legitimate).
43 See id.
44 See, e.g.,
Change
of
Address—Online
Forms,
USA.GOV,
http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Services/Change-Of-Address.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2012); Change
Your
Phone
Number
on
Sprint.com,
SPRINT,
http://support.sprint.com/support/article/Change_your_phone_number_on_sprintcom/case-ib37696420090701-102238?INTNAV=SU:AL:MVT (last visited Oct. 16, 2012).
45 See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (2007).
46 See, e.g., N-400 Application for Naturalization, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=48
0ccac09aa5d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=40a9b2149e7df110VgnVCM10000
04718190aRCRD (last updated Apr. 6, 2012); Identity Theft and Your Social Security Number, U.S.
SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. (Oct. 2012), http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/10064.html#a0=5&new=
(follow “Should you get a new Social Security number” hyperlink) (explaining the conditions and
requirements for obtaining a new Social Security Number).
47 See
Clinical
Policy
Bulletin:
Face
Transplantation,
AETNA,
http://www.aetna.com/cpb/medical/data/800_899/0819.html (last modified Sept. 2, 2011).
48 See,
e.g.,
Corrections
to
Birth
Records,
ILL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH,
http://www.idph.state.il.us/vitalrecords/correctioninfo.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (explaining
that amendments to birth records are only permissible to correct mistakes).
49 EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 12. This principle has no general application under United
States law, but some specific manifestations in places such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2012).
50 See 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(c)(iv) (2012) (“A [local exchange carrier] shall not provide access to
unlisted telephone numbers, or other information that its customer has asked the LEC not to make
available, with the exception of customer name and address . . . .”).
39
40
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Furthermore, she can prevent others from pretending to be her.52 But at the base,
she cannot prevent third parties from possessing and using the most fundamental
pieces of information about her: those pieces that define who she is, at least for the
purpose of identifying her.53 That is, one might say, information that the individual
does not own, any more than one owns one’s personal appearance. One can
marginally influence it and mold it, but in the end, it is others who see it and identify
us by it. And they have a perfect right to do that; if people had no right to identify
one another, all commerce—indeed all human interaction—would be impossible. You
have to know with whom you are dealing.54
Basic information about individuals has some value in the marketplace.55
Facebook recently acquired Face.com,56 creators of a facial recognition software
product, suggesting that Facebook sees value in the ability to recognize individuals
by their appearance.57 My age, my sex, where I live, my telephone number, what I do
for a living—all of these narrow somewhat the goods or services I might be interested
in buying, and at least permit a merchant to avoid wasting money trying to sell me
things I am highly unlikely to buy.58 But when combined with other facts about me,
as well as my purchasing and lifestyle habits, the information can become
considerably more valuable and also considerably more subject to potential abuse.59
We now turn to these other bits of information.

B. Sensitive Facts about Individuals
The EU Directive, implementing legislation in the member states, and United
States state and federal law, all identify categories of information about the
individual that are considered particularly sensitive and subject to special
51 In many jurisdictions, publishing of social security numbers is prohibited. See, e.g., MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 445.81–.87 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1373 (2012).
52 Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1028. A closely
analogous concept is the right of a celebrity to control use of his or her identity for personal gain (the
“right of publicity”). See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2012).
53 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83(d)(1)(A); EU Directive, supra note 37, art.2(b).
54 See 18 U.S.C. § 1028. Here again the analogy to trademarks is instructive. Trademark law
protects the interest of the public in knowing the source or origin of goods and services. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127. Identity law, if we may call it that, protects the interest of everyone in knowing whom they
are dealing with. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028.
55 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 11:32 (“Even for noncelebrities, there exists a marketplace for
the use of the identity of ordinary people in advertising.”).
56 Lauren
Indivik, Facebook Acquires Face.com, MASHABLE BUS. (June 18, 2012),
http://mashable.com/2012/06/18/facebook-acquires-face-com/.
57 Samantha Murphy, Facebook’s Facial-Recognition Acquisition Raises Privacy Concerns,
MASHABLE SOC. MEDIA (June 25, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/06/25/facebook-facial-recognitionprivac/.
58 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE
BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING,
at
i
(2009),
available
at,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf (citing benefits of behavioral advertising).
59 See Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., 423 F.3d 512, 518 (5th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
the primary purpose of 5 U.S.C. § 522a(b) is to prevent publicizing information that is detrimental to
a person’s character or reputation).
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protections.60 While the exact types of information that are considered sensitive vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,61 there is an international consensus that two
categories of information—information that could be used for purposes of unlawful
discrimination and financial information—deserve special attention and protection.62

1. Information subject to potential abuse
Information in the category of being subject to potential abuse always includes
information about an individual’s health, which is universally considered sensitive
and subject to special protection.63 It may also include information about religion,
political affiliation, marital status, and sexual orientation, among other categories.64
Article 8 of the EU Directive defines this as “data revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the
processing of data concerning health or sex life.”65
The United Kingdom
implementing legislation, the U.K. Data Protection Act of 1998,66 expands this
definition slightly, defining “sensitive personal data” as data about the individual’s
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or similar beliefs, trade union
membership, physical or mental health or condition, sexual life, or criminal history.67
A number of states in the U.S. have adopted legislation that similarly regulates
“sensitive personal information,” typically protecting information relating to an
60 See EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 8 (prohibiting the use of “data revealing racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, . . . and health
or sex life”); Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29, § 2 (Eng.) [hereinafter Data Protection Act]
(implementing the EU Directive and further protecting personal data regarding the commission of a
crime or related proceedings); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 530/5 (2012) (restricting the collection of
personal information including an individual’s first and last name in conjunction with Social
Security number, driver’s license number, state identification card number, or financial account
information, such as bank or credit card number, access code, and password); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d6(a)
(2012) (protecting individually identifiable health information); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (defining
records about individuals that government agencies may not disclose).
61 Compare EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 8. (deeming information about racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and health or
sex life sensitive information), and Data Protection Act, supra note 60, § 2 (deeming the same in
addition to criminal history), with 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 530/5 (prohibiting the collection of first
and last names in conjunction with a Social Security number, driver’s license or state identification
number, or financial account number), and 5 U.S.C. § 552a (prohibiting government agencies from
disclosing information about citizens related to “education, financial transactions, medical history,
and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol,
or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a
photograph”).
62 See, e.g., EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 8 (defining sensitive personal data); Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (making it unlawful for employers to
discriminate based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 530/5
(protecting personal financial information).
63 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 17935.
64 See Data Protection Act, supra note 60, § 2.
65 EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 8.
66 Data Protection Act, supra note 60.
67 Id. § 2.
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individual’s physical or mental health.68 At the U.S. federal level there is no general
regulation of sensitive personal information falling into this category, but the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)69 provides a broad definition
of health-related information that is subject to strict standards regarding safety and
disclosure.70
Article 8 of the EU Directive requires member states to prohibit entirely the
“processing” of any such sensitive personal information, unless the processing is for
one of a limited set of permitted purposes.71 This brings sensitive personal data
closer to the exclusionary right of a property owner, but not the whole way.72
Although the purposes for which sensitive personal data may be processed without
the individual’s consent are substantially narrower than those applicable to personal
information generally,73 they are broad enough that it would be difficult to say that
an individual owns his sensitive personal data.74 As an example, the permissible
purposes for which basic personal information may be processed include
“performance of a contract.”75 This is not a permissible purpose with respect to
sensitive personal data, but meeting one’s obligations under employment law is a
permissible purpose for processing sensitive personal data.76 It is also permissible to
process personal data for purposes of delivering health services.77
United States law regarding sensitive personal information is fundamentally
different.78 There is no general prohibition on its collection or dissemination;79
instead, laws tend to focus on the misuse of such information for discriminatory
purposes.80 Thus, it is quite legal in the U.S. to maintain and sell a database listing
Democrats or Republicans or Mormons or Native Americans.81 There is not even a
hint in our law that such information is private or belongs to the individual.82 On the
68
69

1936.

See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.002(a)(2)(B) (West 2012).
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.

70 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, sec. 262,
§§ 117177, 110 Stat. 1936, 202129 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1320d-6 (2012)).
71 EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 8.
72 Compare Data Protection Act, supra note 60, § 10 (allowing individuals to preclude others
from obtaining, recording, holding, or operating on personal data, subject to a few exceptions), with
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (granting patent owners the unqualified right to exclude all others from
“making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention”).
73 See EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 8.
74 See id. art. 7 (giving reasons why processing of personal data may be necessary even without
the consent of the data subject).
75 Id. art. 7(b).
76 Data Protection Act, supra note 60, § 7.
77 Id. § 41C.
78 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 1028.
79 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(a)(7), (b); 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a).
80 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(f); 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a).
81 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(a)(7), (b).
82 See Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 216–
17 (1890). In a back-handed way, United States law does recognize that some facts ought not to be
collected and released, but the focus there is more typically on the means for capturing the
information—“invasion” of privacy—than on the nature of the facts themselves. Id. In the United
States, if a person posts embarrassing photos or videos on the Internet, he cannot complain about
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other hand, if one used such a database as a criterion for hiring or firing, one could
violate a wide variety of anti-discrimination laws.83 Health information is an
exception “Protected Health Information” is regulated in a manner that is more
closely analogous to the European model:
HIPAA features enhanced notice
requirements, as well as the requirement that “Covered Entities” (generally, health
care providers and insurers) obtain consent before using or disclosing protected
health information for any purpose other than treatment, payment, or other health
care operations.84
In either case, a fundamental part of the rationale for these controls is that
sensitive personal information is easily subject to abuse or misuse, both by
governments and by private employers, neighbors, or others.85 Thus, the United
States and the EU share a similar goal in regulating this type of information, but the
means they employ to reach that end are quite different. The EU focuses on both the
collection and use of such data;86 the U.S. focuses on its misuse.87

2. Financial Information
The second broad category of information singled out for special protection is
financial information.88 Here, United States and European law are more closely
allied.89 For example, financial information does not fall within the United
Kingdom’s definition of sensitive personal information,90 and the processing of
financial information is therefore not subject to the special limitations that apply to
the processing of sensitive personal information.91 At the same time, analogues to
the general EU Directive principles appear in the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FRCA”),92 the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLB”),93 and in a variety of state laws
designed to protect financial information and provide a remedy if it is improperly
somebody else collecting and storing the information they contain. In Europe, this would be illegal if
the data controller’s use of the information did not fall into a narrow set of exceptions. See EU
Directive, supra note 37, art. 7.
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting employment
discrimination based on disabilities).
84 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508. -6.
85 See Jacobs v. Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., 423 F.3d 512, 518 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that the
primary purpose of 5 U.S.C. § 522a(b) is to prevent unauthorized publication of information that is
detrimental to character reputation).
86 EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 7; see also Data Protection Act, supra note 60 (“An Act to
make new provision for the regulation of the processing of information relating to individuals,
including the obtaining, holding, use or disclosure of such information.”).
87 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b); 18 U.S.C. § 1028.
88 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012).
89 See Virginia Boyd, Financial Privacy in the United States and the European Union: A Path
to Translating Regulatory Harmonization, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 939, 968–69 (2006).
90 Data Protection Act, supra note 60, § 2.
91 Id. § 7.
92 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x.
93 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.).
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disclosed.94 FCRA permits an individual to gain access to information about his
credit record and to insist on correction of erroneous information.95 GLB requires
financial institutions to adopt policies informing consumers of their policies
respecting the consumers’ financial information that the institution collects, protects,
and uses.96 It also gives consumers a right to opt out of information sharing beyond
the collecting institution.97 In these respects both FCRA and GLB effectively
incorporate, with respect to credit and financial information, principles that are
given much more general application under the EU Directive,98 with one important
difference: GLB gives only an opt-out right, whereas the EU Directive, and
implementing legislation in member states, generally requires opt-in before personal
information can be disseminated outside of the information controller and processers
providing services to the controller.99

C. Behavioral Facts about Individuals
Thus far, we have discussed what one might consider comparatively static
elements of personal identity. There is, however, a far more dynamic category of
personal information that may have less potential for abuse than the static
categories, but far more potential for commercial exploitation, particularly when it is
combined with basic elements of personal identity. This category comprises the
transactions and other electronic behaviors that are effected, recorded, confirmed, or
stored electronically, often via the Internet.100

94 See, e.g., 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01 (2012) (governing the security of, among other things,
financial information). Similar laws exist in many other jurisdictions, in some cases mandating
security measures and in other cases mandating disclosure and remediation following an
unauthorized breach of security. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6803, 1681g(d).
95 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g, 1681i. In this respect, the FCRA implements one of the basic principles
of the EU Directive, but only with respect to the very narrow category of credit information. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681g, 1681i.
96 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 501, 503, 113 Stat. 1338, 143637, 1439
(1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6803 (2012)).
97 Id. § 502, 113 Stat. at 1437–39 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6802).
98 Compare EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 6 (requiring Member States to provide adequate
safeguards for all personal data), and EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 12 (guaranteeing individual’s
the right to obtain and challenge all personal data relating to the individual), with 15 U.S.C. § 6803
(requiring financial institutions to implement and disclose privacy policies), and 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g,
1681i (permitting individual’s to gain access to financial and credit information, and to challenge
erroneous information).
99 EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 7.
100 See Steven C. Bennett, Regulating Online Behavioral Advertising, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
899, 908–09 (2011) (discussing efforts on the part of various agencies to regulate online behavioral
advertising). “Behavioral advertising,” which targets individuals based on their browsing and
transactional behavior, has spawned a growing legal literature. See, e.g., Dustin D. Berger,
Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 3, 41–43 (2011) (discussing FTC self-regulatory principles regarding behavioral targeting in
advertising); Matthew S. Kirsch, Do-Not-Track: Revising the EU’s Data Protection Framework to
Require Meaningful Consent for Behavioral Advertising, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 24–38 (2011)
(giving an overview of the EU’s Data Protection Initiative and its impact on behavioral targeting).
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Information cascades from every transaction on the Internet, rushing
effortlessly over international boundaries and transactions. Take this personal
account as an example: My wife and I sent our daughter a Mother’s Day present, a
basket of fruit. To do this we logged onto the Web from where we were at the time—
England—and searched Google for companies delivering fruit. We visited two
different websites for fruit delivery. After scrolling through their respective
offerings, we decided on a fruit basket from Edible Arrangements and ordered it to be
delivered on Mother’s Day to our daughter, paying with a credit card via PayPal. We
promptly received an email confirmation of our order, including not only our email
address, but also our daughter’s address and what we sent her as well.
By then we had left a sizeable trail of valuable information that was originated
in England, ran through the servers of British Telecom, then through the servers of
Google/U.K., then to the servers of the ISP providers to Edible Arrangements and
Edible Bouquets, and finally to the databases of Edible Arrangements and Edible
101 The information included PII about us: our name and address, the
Bouquets.
fact that we travel, the fact that we have a daughter, our means of payment, and
even the different options we considered before landing on our selection of Mother’s
Day present. If we had used a mobile device, we also would have transmitted realtime information about our whereabouts, our peripatetic habits, and even our inperson shopping habits that made no use of the Internet whatsoever.102 Like Hansel
and Gretel, mobile devices leave a trail of locational breadcrumbs behind their
users.103 These crumbs are eagerly snatched by the device and service providers, who
can associate them with mapping information to provide real-time advertisements
and information to their users.104 We also left a deposit of valuable information
about our daughter: her name and address and the fact that she is a mother, both of
which suggest targeted marketing and sales efforts that would be impossible without
access to such information.
There is no doubt that companies assiduously track behavioral information.
“Real-time ad bidding”—associating on-line advertisements with browsing history—
is fundamental to the business models of companies such as Google and Amazon,105
101 See Fact Sheet 18:
Online Privacy:
Using the Internet Safely, PRIVACY RTS.
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs18-cyb.htm#Internet_Service (last updated Oct.
2012).
102 Melissa Loudon, Mobile Surveillance—A Primer, MOBILEACTIVE.ORG (June 10, 2009),
http://mobileactive.org/howtos/mobile-surveillance-primer.
103 Id.
104 See Quentin Hardy, Head to Head Over Mobile Maps, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2012, at B1.
Service and device providers such as Google and Apple compete aggressively to capture the value of
mapping and location information. See id.; Danielle Kucera, Apple to Feature Yelp Check-Ins Within
IPhone Maps App, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-25/appleto-feature-yelp-check-ins-within-iphone-maps-app.html; Steven Duque, Twitter Places: To Check-in
or Not to Check-in?, WALL ST. CHEAT SHEET (June 19, 2010), http://wallstcheatsheet.com/breakingnews/twitter-places-to-check-in-or-not-to-check-in.html/ (providing insight into the economic
potential and social costs of location-driven services such as Foursquare and Twitter Places).
105 Eric Savitz, Facebook Exchange and the Rise of Real-Time Ad Bidding, FORBES (June 14,
2012, 4:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/06/14/facebook-exchange-and-the-riseof-real-time-ad-bidding/print/.
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and Facebook recently announced a service it calls “Facebook Exchange” that uses
cookies Facebook places on browsers to target ads to Facebook users.106 A recent
study concluded that, since November 2010, behavioral tracking has increased
400%.107 The study found that on average a visit to a website triggers fifty-six (!)
instances of data collection.108
Who owns this information? In the U.S., end customer lists are considered a
classic example of a trade secret,109 and there is very little doubt that the customer
lists of the Edible Arrangements company, and of the franchisee we chose to make
and deliver the fruit, would be considered trade secrets that are owned by those
companies.110 There is also very little doubt that any additional information they can
glean from my Web visit—what options I considered, how long I was on the site, how
I paid, to whom the fruit was delivered, where I was when I placed the order—would
be included in the information that they could protect as their trade secrets.111 On
the other hand, these facts are not quite theirs: I am perfectly free to disclose this
information, and I just did. It is the aggregation of information about customers that
U.S. law would protect against unauthorized disclosure (more on this later).112 In the
U.S., Edible Arrangements and its franchisee are generally free to store and use the
information about my transaction, and to make money by selling it to third parties.113
Also, on the U.S. end, PayPal would be considered a financial institution for
purposes of GLB, and their possession of my credit card and other financial
information would be governed by the GLB principles.114 They must have a privacy
106 Douglas MacMillan & Jonathan Erlichman, Facebook to Debut Real-Time Bidding for
Advertising, BLOOMBERG, (June 14, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-13/facebook-todebut-real-time-bidding-for-advertising.html. A Facebook user cannot opt-out of the cookies
Facebook uses for this purpose. Id. The only way to avoid the collection and use of this data is to
disable the cookies on third-party websites or on the user’s browser, either of which would
substantially degrade the browsing experience by requiring the user to re-input basic information
every time a page is visited. Id.
107 Elinor Mills, Behavioral Data Tracking Rising Dramatically (Q&A), CNET NEWS, (June 19,
2012, 11:55 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57456273-83/behavioral-data-tracking-risingdramatically-q-a/.
108 Id.;
see also Bethany Rubin Henderson, Hey That’s Personal! When Companies Sell
Customer Information Gathered Through the Internet, 14 BUS. L. TODAY 13, 13 (2004) (claiming the
majority of companies collect “personally identifiable information from online visitors”).
109 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474–75 (1974); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1839
(2012) (including a compilation as a type of protectable trade secret); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)
(2012) (defining a trade secret as any information having economic value derived from its secrecy).
California is one of forty-seven states to have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act definition of
trade secrets. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d).
110 See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 474–75.
111 Julie A. Katz, To Be a Trade Secret or Not To Be a Trade Secret: Practical Considerations
when Protecting IP Assets, in IP VALUE 2012: BUILDING AND ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
VALUE: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE FOR THE BOARDROOM 53, 53 (10th ed. 2012), available at
http://www.iam-magazine.com/issues/complete.ashx?g=a4169eff-870c-4f39-ad00-459d81e88bff.
112 Hamilton-Ryker Grp., LLC v. Keymon, No. W2008-00936-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 323057, at
*15–16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010).
113 15 U.S.C. § 6802. There is in fact a very robust market in the U.S. for customer information
of this kind.
114 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A). The GLB defines “financial institution,” by reference to 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(k), to mean any institution in the business of engaging in activity that is (A) “financial in
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policy that I have been made aware of, and must give me an opt-out right before they
can sell information about me to third parties.115 Not surprisingly, PayPal has all of
these in place;116 they have clearly given some attention to the rules and regulations
in this regard. Among other things, their policy gives information about the “cookies”
they leave on my computer when I do business with them,117 which of course is
another species of personal information that my transaction generated.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act118 makes it a crime to intercept my
electronic communications while in transit,119 and the Stored Communications Act120
makes it a crime to access, without authorization, the Internet systems through
which my wife and I placed our order.121 The United States does not otherwise
significantly regulate the collection and retention of information about my
transactions, but it does impose some regulations on what can be done with the
information.122 Under the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003,123 on-line advertisers must
provide an option by which the recipient can opt-out of receiving future email
advertisements.124 Under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,125 a U.S.
nature or incidental to such financial activity” or (B) “complementary to a financial activity and does
not pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or the financial
system generally.” Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k); see also MARK SILBERGELD, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM.,
FEDERAL AND STATE LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF CONSUMERS’ FINANCIAL
CFA HANDBOOK:
INFORMATION PRIVACY AND SECURITY 4–5 (2009).
115 15 U.S.C. §§ 6803, 6802(b) (2012). PayPal in fact adopts an opt-in policy respecting sales of
personal information it collects to third parties. Privacy Policy, PAYPAL, https://cms.paypal.com/cgibin/marketingweb?cmd=_render-content&content_ID=ua/Privacy_full&locale.x=en_US (last visited
Oct. 1, 2012).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
119 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
120 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12.
This statute has assumed several
names by different commentators. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act,
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1243 n.1 (2004). I’ve chosen
the simplest.
121 18 U.S.C. § 2701.
122 PAULA SELIS ET. AL., CONSUMER PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION: PROTECTING PERSONAL
INFORMATION
THROUGH
COMMERCIAL
BEST
PRACTICES
2
(2002),
available
at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/Safeguarding_Consumers/Consumer_Issues_AZ/Identity_Theft_(Privacy)/PrivacyPolicy.pdf (“In the United States there is no comprehensive
privacy law that addresses the collection or use of personal information.”). Although there are few
laws on the books, the digital advertising industry has published self-regulation guidelines about
online behavioral targeted advertising. AM. ASS’N OF ADVER. AGENCIES, ET AL., SELF-REGULATORY
PRINCIPLES
FOR
ONLINE
BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING
(2009),
available
at
http://www.iab.net/media/file/ven-principles-07-01-09.pdf. Also, the Obama Administration, the
FTC, and various members of Congress have proposed variations on a “Privacy Bill of Rights.” THE
WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012); FED.
TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICY MAKERS (2012).
123 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7701–13 (2012).
124 Id. § 7704(a)(5).
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vendor is required to obtain prior consent before it can send a marketing text to a
mobile phone.126
On the English end, it is unlikely that the information about my web surfing or
transaction was captured and maintained by British Telecom127 or Google/U.K.
longer than necessary to complete the transaction. That is because I did not opt-in to
permit them to do so, and therefore, they likely could not establish a legitimate
reason to retain the information under the data protection principles of Article 7 of
the EU Directive.128 In other words, the potentially valuable information about me
and my transaction has, at least in principle, evaporated on the European side of the
Atlantic before it can be used.129 If the facts were reversed, so that I was placing an
order from the U.S. to a vendor in England, the resulting rights would have been
quite different. Without my express consent, the English vendor could not have
retained records about my transaction longer than required to complete the
transaction, could not have sold it to third parties, and could not have used it to
make sales to me in the future.130 Like the U.S. vendor, if the English vendor sent
me commercial emails, it would be required to give me an opt-out right under the EU
Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communication. (“E-Privacy Directive”)131 On
the other hand, Google/U.S. could and undoubtedly would capture all the information
about my Web surfing exercise, selling that information to its advertisers so that
they can target ads to me the next time I log on to Google to do some fruit or Mother’s
Day shopping.132 The value of this information in Google’s hands—or Facebook’s, or
Amazon’s—is directly measured by the lofty heights of their market
capitalizations.133 They are, in other words, profiting from my identity—who I am,

47 U.S.C. § 227.
Id. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). Although not explicit in the statute, the FCC has clarified that
§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) includes text messages in addition to voice calls. See Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,144, 44,165
(July 25, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 64 & 68). The CAN-SPAM Act also requires prior
consent if the message uses an Internet address that includes an Internet domain name (usually the
part of the address after the individual or electronic mailbox name and the “@” symbol). 15 U.S.C.
§ 7712.
127 See Directive 2002/58, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July
2002 on Privacy and Electronic Communications, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC) [hereinafter EPrivacy Directive]. The E-Privacy Directive prohibits, among other things, traffic and
location data about subscribers and users from being used for marketing or other purposes
without the individual’s consent. Id. arts. 6, 9.
128 EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 7.
129 Id.
130 Data Protection Act, supra note 60, § 4, sch. 1.
131 E-Privacy Directive, supra note 127, art. 13. Note that the English vendor could market to
me via email only if it had obtained my email address via my prior transaction. Unlike the U.S.
vendor. the English vendor could not have purchased my email address from someone else and then
marketed to me without my consent. See, e.g., Data Protection Act, supra note 60, § 17.
132 JOHN F. TANNER & MARY ANNE RAYMOND, PRINCIPLES OF MARKETING ch. 3 (Flat World
Knowledge ed., 2010), available at http://catalog.flatworldknowledge.com/bookhub/2030?e=fwk133234-ch03#fwk-133234-ch03 (discussing consumer behavior and how they make buying decisions).
133 See, e.g., Erin Carlyle, Larry Page’s Fortune Up As Google Overtakes Microsoft in Market
Cap, FORBES (Oct. 1, 2012, 4:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erincarlyle/2012/10/01/larry-pagesfortune-up-as-google-overtakes-microsoft-in-market-cap/.
125
126
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what I’m interested in, what I buy—and I do not have any right to claim royalties on
their profit.134 In the U.S., this information about me is in some important sense
theirs, not mine.135 In England, it is a little less theirs, but hardly more mine.136

II. DIGITAL IDENTITY
One might think of a person’s digital identity by analogy to a pointillist
painting. Thousands upon thousands of tiny bits of digital information about an
individual, including what we have called basic facts, sensitive facts, and
transactional facts, can be assembled to form a picture of the individual: his likes,
dislikes, predispositions, resources; and in fact, any facet of his personality that has
had contact with the Internet.137 The picture may vary, depending on the interest of
the digital assembler of information and the access of that person to the individual’s
digital life,138 but it will be a picture of identity nonetheless.
Who owns these pictures? We have already noted that the individual pieces of
digital information are not owned, in any ordinary sense, by the individual
generating them.139 But what about the pictures as a whole? Who owns them? In
some sense, the individual certainly created them, particularly as they relate to
transactions effected on the Internet or information posted on the Internet. Does
that mean that the individual owns them?140
Here we encounter something more closely akin to traditional notions of
property rights, and the answer is a bit surprising. In Europe, the Database
Directive,141 adopted by the European Commission in 1996, requires member states

See Bergelson, supra note 30, at 383.
See sources cited supra note 109. The fact that a company holds the aggregated information
about a customer compiled into a customer list as a trade secret indicates an ownership right in that
information. See Hamilton-Ryker Grp., LLC v. Keymon, No. W2008-00936-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL
323057, at *15–16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2010).
136 See Kirsch, supra note 100, at 7–9. Not surprisingly, there are proposals to require consent
before information about one’s on-line behavior can be tracked for commercial purposes. See id. at
17–21.
137 See Erica Newland, Disappearing Phone Booths: Privacy in the Digital Age, CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY AND TECH. (May 2012), https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/Privacy-In-Digital-Age.pdf
(cataloguing various types of data capable of being tracked by third parties).
138 See Mell, supra note 30, at 6.
139 Bergelson, supra note 30, at 383; see also Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and
the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1342 (2011).
140 I propose this question in part to test the theses that property rights either flow from the
efforts of the individual, see JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 314 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690), or manifest individuality and thus promote individual
autonomy, see IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 56 (John Ladd ed. &
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1999) (1797); MERGES, supra note 1, at 31–33, 68–77 (discussing the
property concepts of John Locke and Immanuel Kant). What could be more personal, or more the
product of my individual efforts, than my identity? Should it not, then, be my property?
141 Directive 96/9 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal
Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 (EC) [hereinafter Database Directive].
134
135
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to provide protection for databases.142 U.K. regulations implementing the Database
Directive expressly state that “[a] property right (‘database right’) subsists, in
accordance with this Part, in a database if there has been a substantial investment in
obtaining, verifying or presenting the contents of the database.”143 Similarly, the
United States Copyright Act provides copyright protection for compilations so long as
there is copyrightable authorship in their selection or arrangement.144
Therefore, the compilations of facts that comprise a person’s digital identities
are subject to ownership, but the owner is not the person; it is the compiler!145 Quite
remarkably, the individuals who generate the information that comprises their
digital identities do not own the databases, and therefore, in a very real sense, do not
own their own identities.146 Their identities, the images of which can vary from
compiler to compiler, are owned by the companies who assemble the information into
something useful and saleable.147 The companies and enterprises that gather the
information, package it, and make it available for exploitation and sale, often as an
aggregation of individual compilations, own it and can profit from it.148

142 See id. art 7. The European Commission published a report in 2005 questioning whether
the Database Directive had been effective, but no further action has been taken to amend or improve
it. First Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases (Dec. 12, 2005),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf.
143 The Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations, 1997, S.I. 1997/3032, art. 13 (Eng.).
144 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
145 Id. To continue the analogy to Pointillism, Seurat surely owned copyright in his paintings,
but not in the individual points of color of which they were composed. See generally Bergelson,
supra note 30, at 404 (cataloguing court decisions acknowledging property rights of compilers of
personal information). There is, of course, also the possibility that someone could be his own
compiler, creating in effect a digital self-portrait. The personal pinboards created by users of
www.Pinterest.com are an example. See What is Pinterest?, PINTEREST, http://pinterest.com/about/
(last visited Oct. 17, 2012). The individual Pinterest user creates his or her own profile of
preferences by “pinning” images from other Pinterest pinboards or from other websites. Id.
146 Dan Gillmor, Google+ Forces Us to Question Who Owns Our Digital Identity, THE GUARDIAN
(July 13, 2011, 8:13 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jul/13/googleplus-online-identiy.
147 SELIS ET. AL., supra note 122, at 9 (“A consumer’s personal information has the potential of
being bought and sold like any other valuable commodity.”).
148 See Tanzina Vega & Edward Wyatt, U.S. Requests Tougher Rules on Data Sales, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, at A1. One can distinguish aggregations of facts about a single individual
from aggregations of facts about multiple individuals, but the legal principles attaching to these
aggregations are not different. See 17 U.S.C. § 103. People commonly focus on the second of these,
and much of what is referred to as “Big Data” resides in such multiple-individual aggregations. See
supra note 27. On the other hand, it is the aggregation of facts about particular persons that
delivers real marketing value—who is this person? How old is she? How much money does she
have? Where does she live? Where is she now? What does she typically like to buy? See Clair Cain
Miller & Somini Sengupta, In Mobile World, Tech Giants Scramble to Get Up to Speed, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2012, at A1 (“[M]obile provides huge opportunities for these businesses, industry analysts
say.. That is largely because people reveal much more about themselves on phones than they do on
computers, from where they go and when they sleep to whom they talk to and what they want to
buy.”).
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The conclusion that one does not own one’s own identity might seem jarring at
first.149 On further reflection, though, one realizes that the lack of ownership over
one’s digital identity is not very different from one’s identity outside of the digital
space.150 Identity is an edifice built out of facts about one’s self that are known to
others—basic facts, sensitive facts, historical facts, genetic facts, relational facts,
transactional facts. These facts can be influenced by the individual, but they are not
owned by the individual, either individually or in the aggregate.151
Think of identity as reputation. Do I own my reputation? I have a reasonably
broad opportunity to mold my reputation by word and deed, and I have legal redress
if my reputation is unfairly tarnished,152 but if I have committed a crime or a fraud,
the people I deal with are entitled to know that and to protect themselves
accordingly.153 If on the other hand I have behaved in an exemplary fashion—paying
my debts, respecting others, honoring contracts, avoiding litigation—others are
entitled to know that as well. The individual might not want everyone to know the
bad things, but the individual cannot in general prevent it. One’s reputation is, to a
large extent, the product of one’s actions and initiative, but it is not, as a result, one’s
property.154 It is, in a sense, community property.155 The individual builds it, at
149 See sources cited supra note 30. Indeed, this legal fact seems to have inspired legal scholars
such as Mell and Bergelson to exert enormous efforts to propose legal property rights in PII or
identity or both. See id.
150 See Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1953) (“Consistent with their own
voluntary assumption of this particular pose in a public place, plaintiffs’ right to privacy as to this
photographed incident ceased and it in effect became a part of the public domain . . . .”).
151 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
152 See Barrows v. Wareham Fire Dist., 82 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 627 (2012) (“[T]he gravamen of
the tort of defamation does not lie in the nature or degree of the misconduct but in its outcome, i.e.,
the injury to the reputation of the plaintiff.”). The remedy, of course, lies in the tort of defamation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). There are well-known differences between the
United States and the U.K. in the scope of this tort, driven largely by First Amendment
considerations in the United States that do not apply in the U.K. See Doug Rendleman, Collecting a
Libel Tourist’s Defamation Judgment?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467, 478–80 (comparing U.S. and
U.K. defamation laws); compare N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–71 (1964) (discussing
that there must be a freedom to speak openly, especially in debates and criticism, even when that
speech may not have been proven to be true), with Defamation Act, 1996, c. 31 (Eng.) (discussing the
law of defamatory statements without making reference to any right or freedom to speak openly
regardless of the context in which the defamatory statements were made).
153 See Sandra D. Scott, What is a Police “Investigative Report”?, 51 J. MO. B. 83, 84 (1995)
(discussing one State’s policy of informing the public about crimes in the community). In the U.K.,
evidence about criminal prosecutions is considered sensitive personal information and is therefore
subject to special protections. Data Protection Act, supra note 60, § 2. With the exception of
juvenile crimes, there is no comparable principle in the U.S. See, e.g., Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157,
166 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[C]riminal records are matters of public record, easily obtained upon request,
and . . . there is no automatic right to expunction thereof . . . .”); Joanna S. Markman, In Re Gault:
A Retrospective in 2007: Is It Working? Can It Work?, 9 BARRY L. REV. 123, 127 & 141 n.29 (2007)
(discussing the confidentiality of juvenile records).
154 Heymann, supra note 139, at 1342. This conception diverges sharply from John Locke’s
view that the admixture of personal effort with raw material justifies property rights, or even
Immanuel Kant’s conception of property as the manifestation of individual liberty. See MERGES,
supra note 1, at 31–33, 68–77.
155 Heymann, supra note 139, at 1342 (“[R]eputation is a social creation dependent on
intergroup communication.”). Note in this connection that one’s identity can be ascertained and
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least in part, but the community members can then use it—or decide that it would be
unfair or unjust to use it—whether the individual wants them to or not.156
We can also return here to the analogy to trademark law. Trademark rights
attach to the “good will” associated with a vendor and its products.157 The good will
of a business is listed as one of its assets;158 indeed, it may be the business’s largest
asset, but it is utterly reliant on the public’s perception of the business.159 By change
of heart, or even by generic use, the public at large can destroy this “asset,” and the
business has no legal recourse whatsoever.160
We might also return to our watershed analogy. No one owns the raindrops
falling on the watershed, but when value is created by damming streams of
information, that value can be owned and exploited by the persons building and
running the dams. Eventually, of course, the information returns to the oceanic
public domain.

A.

The Exploitation of Identity

If it is jarring to consider that one’s digital identity is owned by others, not by
one’s self, it is still more disturbing to consider what the owners might do with their
information. It is one thing for Amazon to keep track of the books you bought and to
use that information to identify other books you might like to buy. This is not too
different from the proprietor of a local bookstore (if there remains one that has not
yet been put out of business by Amazon) telling you that he just got in a book by an
author he knows you will like. This is good customer service, as long as it is not too
insistent. It would be quite another thing for the local bookseller to ring up his
friend, the kitchenware merchant across the street, and tell him you just bought a
cookbook that requires a particular utensil that the merchant might want to sell to
him. The latter has the feel of an invasion of privacy.161 This is of course exactly
owned by anyone who has the ability and takes the trouble to assemble the relevant facts. See 17
U.S.C. § 103. Like any other compilation of data, another person can access the same or similar
data and assemble its own compilation, without infringing the property rights of the first compiler.
Id. An image of one’s identity can be owned by anybody taking the trouble to compile it. Id.
156 See Heymann, supra note 139, at 1342.
Merges struggles a bit to bring intellectual
property within John Rawls’ framework for a just society. MERGES, supra note 1, at 102–05
(discussing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harv. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999)). It is far easier to
bring the non-property concept of identity/reputation proposed in the text within the framework of
what persons in the “original position” would agree upon. They could well agree, for example, that
the community ought to have ready access to most reputational facts, but that it would be unwise to
permit the free exchange of sensitive personal information that is subject to misuse, or that could
easily be used to the disadvantage of the least fortunate in society (Rawls’ Second Principle). Id. at
104.
157 Heymann, supra note 139, at 1343.
158 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 2.19.
159 See id.
160 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012) (allowing a petition to be filed for the cancellation of a
registered trademark if it becomes the generic name the public uses for a good or service).
161 The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (“FACTA”), an amendment to the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, prohibits companies from using certain credit information received from
an affiliate to market goods or services to a consumer, unless the consumer is given notice, a
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what Amazon is doing all the time,162 and in important part, what legislatures and
regulators react to with the plethora of privacy laws we have today.163 The problem
is not that the bookseller or Amazon have and own information about your purchase.
The problem is what they do with it.164
One sees a somewhat different issue in Facebook’s “Sponsored Stories” service.
In this service, Facebook features in advertisements the name and picture of
Facebook friends who click a button to show they “like” something, charging a fee to
the provider of the thing that was “liked.”165 Facebook does not share its revenue
with the person doing the “liking.”166 This prompted a class action lawsuit, which
Facebook settled by agreeing to give notice to its users that their preferences would
be exploited in this way, coupled with an opt-out right.167 The problem here cannot
be considered an invasion of privacy. Surely the people who tap “like” intend for
their positive response to be known at least by their “friends,” even if they have not
read the fine print of Facebook’s terms of use. The problem is more directly related
to the exploitation of a person’s identity for profit, which squarely implicates state
right of publicity laws that generally require consent before a person’s name or image
can be used for commercial purposes.168 It is worth noting that Facebook did not
agree to discontinue the Sponsored Sites service.169 Its settlement simply made it
clearer to Facebook users that one of the quid pro quos for their free Facebook service
was, in effect, a license to use their names and likenesses for commercial purposes.170
If a person pays with anything other than cash, there is also the question
whether the vendor has safeguarded the credit card or bank information. Security
reasonable opportunity to opt-out, and a simple and reasonable method for opting-out (the FTC
Affiliate Sharing Rule). Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159,
sec. 214, § 624, 117 Stat. 1952, 1980–82 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-3); see also FTC
Approves Affiliate Marketing Rule Regarding Use of Consumer Information, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION (Oct. 23, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/10/affiliate.shtm.
162 Nick Eaton, Suit:
Amazon Fraudulently Collects, Shares Users’ Personal Info,
http://www.seattlepi.com/business/article/Suit-Amazon-fraudulently-collectsSEATTLEPI.COM,
shares-users-1040886.php (last updated Mar. 2, 2011).
163 See, e.g., Do Not Track Me Online Act of 2011, H.R. 654, 112th Cong. (2011); Commercial
Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011); BEST PRACTICES Act, H.R. 611,
112th Cong. (2011); Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 1528, 112th Cong. (2011); DoNot-Track Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. (2011); Do-Not-Track-Kids Act, H.R. 1895, 112th
Cong. (2011).
164 Hardly a day goes by without a new revelation about the use of personal information or the
unauthorized disclosure of sensitive personal information. See, e.g., Natasha Singer, You For Sale,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at BU1 (raising concerns about Acxiom gathering personal information
from customers and selling it to marketers for targeted advertising when there have been multiple
security breaches).
165 Daily Report: What’s Behind Facebook’s Sponsored Stories, N.Y. TIMES BITS (June 1, 2012,
6:44 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/daily-report-whats-behind-facebooks-sponsoredstories/.
166 See id. The quid pro quo is the free service provided by Facebook to its users.
167 Somini Segupta, To Settle Lawsuit, Facebook Alters Policy for Its Like Button, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 2012, at B2.
168 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS &
MONOPOLIES § 22:32 (4th ed. 1981).
169 See Segupta, supra note 167.
170 Id.
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breaches are distressingly common. In June of 2012, the FTC filed a complaint
against Wyndham Hotels for security lapses that allowed hackers to access sensitive
financial information of more than 600,000 individuals over a three-year period.171
In the same month, LinkedIn, eHarmony, and Last.fm were all hacked, resulting in
the release of millions of users’ passwords,172 and just three months before, the credit
card processor Global Payments reported that some 1.5 million Visa and MasterCard
account numbers had been stolen by hackers.173 Even breaches of less sensitive
information, such as that of Epsilon in which the email addresses of millions of
individuals were inadvertently disclosed, are disturbing and potentially harmful to
individuals.174
Many of the laws respecting PII can thus be understood as limitations on the
ownership rights of, and the creation of liability for, the persons, or rather
businesses, that assemble and own collections of PII.
One might analogize the
collections of PII that comprise one’s digital identities to dangerous
instrumentalities.175 It is okay to build and own them; indeed, their creation
represents the generation of an important new form of wealth in the Internet Age,
but the use of such information must be regulated to avoid harm or unlawful
exploitation.
The www.pleaserobme.com episode is an example.
The
pleaserobme.com website scraped Twitter messages that had been pushed through
the FourSquare social media site to provide a real-time list of people who were not at
home.176 The site apparently intended to raise awareness of the vulnerabilities
created by location information, but its potential for abuse is obvious.177 Facebook
offered, for one day, a service called “Find Friends Nearby” that allowed Facebook

171 Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham
Worldwide Corp., No. 12-cv-01365 (D. Ariz.
June 26, 2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023142/120626wyndamhotelscmpt.pdf.
The gravamen of the
complaint, which alleged losses to customers exceeding $10 million, id. ¶ 2, was that Wyndham’s
privacy policy misrepresented its data security precautions, which, it turned out, had essentially nil
with personally identifiable financial information stored in plain text. Id. ¶¶ 24, 40.
172 Sara Yin, Last.FM Joins eHarmony, LinkedIn to Celebrate Breach Week, SECURITYWATCH
(June 7, 2012, 6:36 PM), http://securitywatch.pcmag.com/none/298865-last-fm-joins-eharmonylinkedin-to-celebrate-breach-week.
173 Brian Krebs, MasterCard, VISA Warn of Processor Breach, KREBS ON SECURITY (March 30,
2012, 1:23 AM), http://www.krebsonsecurity.com/2012/03/mastercard-visa-warn-of-processorbreach/.
174 See, e.g., Singer, supra note 164.
175 See Stecyk v. Bell Helicopter Textron, No. 94-CV-1818, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 609, at *15
n.4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1998) (defining a dangerous instrumentality as “anything which has the
inherent capacity to place people in peril, either in itself (e.g. dynamite), or by a careless use of it
(e.g. boat)”).
176 See Caroline McCarthy, The Dark Side of Geo: PleaseRobMe.com, CNET NEWS (Feb. 17,
2012, 9:55 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-10454981-36.html.
177 Id.
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users to see which friends were nearby.178 It took the service down because of very
real concerns over stalking.179
That this is the case is manifest in the basic principles of privacy legislation as
diverse as the EU Directive, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, HIPAA, Gramm-LeachBliley, and the Massachusetts Data Security Regulations. In each case, the assembly
of personal information about individuals is not prohibited.180 Quite to the contrary,
such assemblies are affirmatively encouraged, particularly in the areas of financial
services and health care, because the information can greatly improve the efficient
and effective provision of financial and health services.181 The use of the information,
however, is regulated and controlled once assembled.182
The regulations and controls fall into two broad classes: (1) requirements for the
security of such information, particularly when it falls into the “sensitive” categories
mentioned above, and (2) regulation over the dissemination of such information to
third parties. In the first of these categories one finds the example of the
Massachusetts Data Security Regulations, which directly specify minimum security
standards to preclude the unauthorized disclosure of PII,183 HIPAA, which mandates
a variety of security standards for health information,184 and the payment card data
security standard (“PCI DSS”), which is enforced through contracts among payment
card companies, banks, and merchants.185 Laws that require prompt notice of the
unlawful disclosure of personal information fall into the same category.186
The second class of control over the use of PII held by third parties inheres in
the variety of conditions that we have already seen on the use and distribution of PII.
These include the almost universal requirement that individuals be provided with

178 See John D. Sutter, Facebook Quietly Unveils “Stalking App,” CNN TECH (June 29, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/25/tech/social-media/facebook-find-friendsnearby/index.html?hpt=hp_bn5. The service was aptly dubbed “the stalking app” by the blog
ReadWriteWeb. Id.
179 Id.
180 EU Directive, supra note 37, art. 6 (stating that personal data “must be . . . collected for
specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes”); 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2012) (stating the Congressional
purpose of the FCRA is to require consumer reporting agencies to collect information “in a manner
which is fair and equitable to the consumer”); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2012) (setting forth permissible
uses of medical information, under the assumption that such information should be collected); 15
U.S.C. § 6802 (setting forth obligations of financial institutions in handling consumer information,
under the assumption that such information should be collected); 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01–.05
(2012) (providing conditions for ownership of non-public information).
181 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502; 15 U.S.C. § 6802.
182 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9 (regulating disclosure of personal information possessed for
medical purposes).
183 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03–.04.
184 45 C.F.R. § 164.306.
185 See PCI SSC Security Standards Overview, PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL,
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2012).
186 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.80–.84 (West 2012) (explaining the California breach
notification law); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 899-aa(3)–(4) (McKinney 2012) (explaining the New York
data breach notification law); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 521.053 (West 2012) (explaining the Texas
data breach notification law); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/5 (2012) (explaining the Illinois data breach
notification law). Breach notification is also required by HIPAA and its implementing regulations.
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.404–.405 (2012).
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notice of the uses to which their PII will be put and the requirement that there be a
division between opt-in and opt-out requirements for the use or disclosure of that
information.187 One might consider these requirements as something falling at least
partly into the realm of consumer education for the digital age. It is not so much that
the collection and exploitation of consumer information is an inherently obnoxious
activity—we consider it good service to know one’s customers and to endeavor to
respond to them personally—but that the facility with which such information can be
collected and disseminated for profit comes as a great and sometimes unpleasant
surprise.188 Notice at least diminishes the surprise. It also provides a basis for
consent where laws, such as the right of publicity, require it.189
All of these restrictions can be understood as limitations on the uses to which
the owner of the collections of PII that we are referring to as “digital identity” can put
that information. This is analogous to the limitations that are imposed on the
owners of a wide variety of other types of property, particularly when the property is
capable of causing harm.190 If, for example, you own a car, you must register it to
drive on the public roads, drive on the proper side of the road, use your turn signals
before you turn, and not exceed the speed limit.191

B. Countervailing Considerations
Let us take stock in where our reasoning has brought us. Digital identity
comprises a collection of thousands of facts about a person, and that person does not
own those facts.192 The facts can be assembled in many ways, each giving a
somewhat different picture of the person—an image, as it were, in a different light or
from a different direction. The law gives the assemblers of those facts, not the
individual, ownership of those digital images.193 There is a somewhat uncertain right
to complain about it if some of the facts comprising the image are untrue194 or if their

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a)–(b) (2012).
See, e.g., Miguel Helft, Critics Say Google Invades Privacy with New Service, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2010, at B1 (describing public backlash after release of “Google Buzz,” a service that used email and chat data to automatically publish users’ contacts without notice or consent).
189 See Jones v. Corbis Corp., 815 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 2011) aff’d, No. 11-56082,
2012 WL 2884790 (9th Cir. July 16, 2012) (“Notices are sometimes posted at these events stating
that celebrities entering the red carpet consent to being photographed and recorded, and also to
having their name or likeness used in connection with the event.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344
(prohibiting the use of a person’s identity without that person’s prior consent, and not requiring the
consent to be in writing).
190 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 923 (imposing a federal licensing requirement on gun ownership and
limiting the use of guns even after they are licensed).
191 See, e.g., 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-100 to 1516.
192 See Bergelson, supra note 30, at 403 (“Currently, neither property nor torts theory
recognizes individuals’ rights in their information.”).
193 See supra notes 180–182 and accompanying text.
194 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g, 1681i.
187
188
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use offends policy,195 but one cannot, in general, complain about the assembly of the
images as a whole. At the same time, the law imposes some rather strict limits on
what the assembler can do with these images.196 One might say that these
assemblies of facts are dangerous instrumentalities, and the misuse of them can give
rise to both strict liability and liability for negligence if they are not used carefully.
Is this a reasonable outcome? Many scholars argue that there should be
property rights in identity.197 Robert Merges, for example, cites the development of a
right of publicity as an example of the creation of a property rights.198 In its original
form, the right of publicity attaches to what one might call a persona: an artifice
built around a person as a result of fame, notoriety, and in many cases the efforts of
teams of publicists.199 Fair enough. If a public persona is as much the creation of a
work as is a character in a novel, why should the persona not have the same level of
protection, more like a copyrighted work, and less like a trademark? This point can
be taken, but at the same time, it does not equate to saying that facts about the
person behind the persona also belong to him or her, nor that a construct built of
those facts should belong to him or her. And, in fact, persons who have property-like
rights in their public personas have virtually no ability to exclude third parties from
facts about their real selves.200
State laws protecting the “right of publicity” present a higher obstacle to this
response because they are not typically limited to famous people; instead, they
typically attach to the use of any person’s name or likeness for commercial

195 See, for example, Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999), for a
discussion of numerous jurisdictions that have recognized a common law tort for the unauthorized
disclosure of confidential medical information.
196 See, e.g., 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.03–.04 (2012) (requiring any entity that deals in
personal information to implement robust, multi-faceted security measures to protect that
information).
197 See Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders:
A Tort for the Misuse of Personal
Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 143–46 (2006) (discussing data trading and the debate among
academics about protecting personal information through property rights).
198 Merges, supra note 1, at 96–101.
199 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1][c] (“The
‘work’ that is the subject of the right of publicity is the persona, i.e., the name and likeness of a
celebrity or other individual.”) (emphasis in original). The right of publicity is currently a state lawbased right. Nineteen states recognize the right by statute: California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Statutes, RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY, http://www.rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last visited Oct. 1, 2012). Twenty-one states
have recognized the right by common law (though it has been replaced by statute in some states):
Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6.3
(2d ed. 2012); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46–49 (1995) (discussing
the right of publicity and its protection through statutory and common law and mentioning several
states that use the common law right of publicity protection).
200 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The purpose of the media’s
use of a person’s identity is central. If the purpose is ‘informative or cultural’ the use is immune; ‘if
it . . . merely exploits the individual [it is not].’” (quoting Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin,
Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1596 (1979))).
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purposes.201 This does not, however, establish that individuals own their digital
identities. In the first place, publicity laws are almost always applied to the use of
persons’ names and likenesses as endorsements in advertisements;202 they are not
applied or understood to apply to the more indirect use of information about a person
for other commercial purposes. Furthermore, their reach is limited to names and
likenesses, and does not extend to transactional information about individuals.203
In recognition of the limitations of privacy and publicity law, two scholars—Vera
Bergelson and Patricia Mell—argue at great length, and with impressive
thoroughness, that a property right should attach to personal information, in the
Bergelson’s case,204 or to “electronic persona” in the Mell’s case.205 At the risk of
injustice by brevity to Bergelson’s extended analysis, one might summarize that she
believes that a tort remedy for invasion of privacy is inadequate and that the
transaction costs of requiring data compilers to obtain the permission of their data
subjects are not worse than the transaction costs of the subjects trying to prevent the
compilations. She believes that, at bottom, it is unjust for third parties to profit from
the individuality of the persons whose personal information resides in the third
parties’ databases:
In a nutshell, the suggested legal regime would give individuals
property rights in their personal information. They would own this
information during their lifetime, subject to a (i) non-exclusive automatic
inalienable license to the original collector and (ii) limited non-exclusive
automatic license to the general public. This way, friends of, say, Robert
Bork would be free to talk, and newspapers free to write, about movies he
watches or books he reads, but a video- or bookstore would not be free to
reveal his customer record even in the heat of his nomination campaign.206

201 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2012) (regulating use of “any person[’s]”
identifying features); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2012) (proscribing use of “another’s” identifying
features); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 369 (Mo. 2003) (stating the elements of a common
law cause of action for violation of the right of publicity as follows: “(1) [t]hat defendant used
plaintiff’s name as a symbol of his identity (2) without consent (3) and with the intent to obtain a
commercial advantage”). But see IND. CODE § 32-36-1-6 (2012) (limiting regulation to people whose
identifying features have “commercial value”).
202 See I. J. Schiffres, Annotation, Invasion of Privacy by Use of Plaintiff’s Name or Likeness in
Advertising, 23 A.L.R.3d 865 § 2[a] (1969). This is what got Facebook into trouble with its
Sponsored Stories service. See supra notes 165–170.
203 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (providing relief for the use of a person’s “name, portrait,
picture, or voice” without consent); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (holding a person liable for damages for
the unauthorized use of another’s “name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness”); IND. CODE § 3236-1-6 (defining “personality” to mean a “person whose name, voice, signature, photograph, image,
likeness, distinctive appearance, gestures, or mannerisms has commercial value” (numbering
omitted)).
204 See generally Bergelson, supra note 30 (arguing that individuals should have property
rights in their personal information). Bergelson lists works that have focused on the social utility of
granting individuals property rights in personal information. Id. at 383 n. 16. She also discusses
defining rights to personal information based on torts or property. Id. at 414–19.
205 Mell, supra note 30, at 68–70.
206 Bergelson, supra note 30, at 442.
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Bergelson’s qualifications (i) and (ii) on the individual’s “property” interest in
her personal information are so broad as to make one wonder whether it is a property
interest at all.207 If Robert Bork’s friends and newspapers can trade in the same
information that is in the possession of the bookstore, can it reasonably be said that
the information belongs to him? Bergelson may be unhappy about the bookstore’s
disclosure of information about Bork’s purchases and may want to create a remedy
for it, but if the information were really his, it should not matter who had
misappropriated it—the friend, bookstore or newspaper.
Bergelson’s analysis also conflates the assembly of information that constitutes
one’s digital identity with the bits of information that go into that assembly. She
dislikes the fact that persons putting together the assembly can profit from it,
whereas the individuals cannot.208 In effect, she reasons that if there is a property
interest in the collection of data, then there ought to be a property interest in the
individual bits of data it comprises.209 But this may prove too much. Copyrights are
granted in collections of facts, none of which individually are subject to ownership,
whether via copyright or otherwise.210
Mell’s position is bolder. While Bergelson acknowledges the right of the “first
collector” to information about an individual, Mell wants even the first collector to be
required to obtain the individual’s consent to collect the information:
The persona should be viewed as property, the ultimate “ownership” or
“fee simple” of which resides in the individual. The rights of any other
entity (i.e., any group, class, association or government) that might obtain,
access, make use of or disclose the persona would be subordinate to those of
the individual. As with other forms of property, the individual’s right to
restrict the use of his persona by others would vary depending upon the
reason for the use.211
Fortunately, her definition of “persona” is limited to “a personal information file
electronically stored, which, by virtue of at least one ‘identifier,’ relates the personal
information to a specific person.”212 Were it not for this, she would have created a
property interest in others’ memories and diaries. She was also writing before the
advent of iPads, iPhones, Droids, the Cloud, and the myriad other new electronic
devices by which memories and images are stored these days.213 Putting these

207 Bergelson distinguishes her property interest from the “fee simple” proposed by Patricia
Mell. Id. at 438; Mell, supra note 30, at 76.
208 Bergelson, supra note 30, at 383 (“[O]n the one hand, [individuals] are powerless to prevent
[their information’s] unauthorized dissemination, and on the other, they are excluded from its
profitable commercial exchange.”).
209 Id. at 419 (quoting Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who?
The Case for a Kantian Right of
Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 418 (1999)).
210 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1991).
211 Mell, supra note 30, at 76.
212 Id. at 4.
213 See, e.g., Michael Chertoff, Cloud Computing and the Looming Global Privacy Battle, WASH.
POST OPINIONS (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cloud-computing-sets-stage-
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anachronistic considerations aside, her conception, like Bergelson’s, upends the basic
principle that people who collect facts own their collections, whether the facts are
human, botanical, zoological, commercial, or of any other nature.214 The nasty fact is
that other people can learn things about us, and we cannot easily make them forget
or keep quiet about what they learn. The best we can do is to try to restrain abuses
that are not justified by legitimate interests.
One must also return to the distinctions between the rights of privacy and
publicity, on the one hand, and a property right in personal identity on the other.
There is no question that the rights associated with PII are almost universally
identified with a right of privacy—the right not to have unconsented intrusions into
or publications of one’s personal affairs.215 In cases such as Facebook’s Sponsored
Stories service, they are also associated with the right of publicity—the right not to
have one’s name or likeness used in advertisements without consent.216 As discussed
above, the history of the development of the law of privacy and publicity, as manifest
in the current regulation of PII, has not required the creation of an individual’s
property right, either in PII or in assemblies of PII comprising his digital identity.217
It is well known that the concept of a right of privacy, now manifest in all of the
laws surveyed in this paper, was first elaborated by Louis Brandeis and Samuel
Warren in their celebrated law review article, The Right to Privacy.218 In their
article, Brandeis and Warren considered and then rejected whether the right to
privacy is a species of property:
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the protection afforded
to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of
writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing publication, is
merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the
individual to be let alone. It is like the right not be assaulted or beaten, the
right not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the
right not to be defamed. In each of these rights, as indeed in all other rights
recognized by the law, there inheres the quality of being owned or possessed
—and (as that is the distinguishing attribute of property) there may be
some propriety in speaking of those rights as property. But, obviously, they
bear little resemblance to what is ordinarily comprehended under that
term. The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal
for-a-global-privacy-battle/2012/02/06/gIQAhV2V2Q_story.html (describing the impact of cloud
computing on the issue of digital privacy).
214 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
215 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 652A (1977).
William L. Prosser identifies four
species of privacy claims, which eventually found their way into the Restatement: false light,
intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of embarrassing facts, and the appropriation of a name or
likeness. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 851–68 (5th ed. 1984).
216 See Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 785, 806 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
217 See Mell, supra note 30, at 8.
218 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 82. The authors were motivated to propound their privacy
thesis by “recent inventions and business methods” that “call attention to the next step that must be
taken for the protection of the person.” Id. at 195. They were concerned about photography and
unscrupulous newspapers. Id. Imagine their shock if confronted with the Internet!
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productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against
publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property,
but that of an inviolate personality.219
It is worth noting that, in 1890, Brandeis and Warren were not even comfortable
with the notion that copyright is a species of property.220 They were, of course,
writing at a time when the only protection for unpublished works was the common
law right of first publication,221 and it is easy to understand how they perceived a
parallel between that right—really, a right to prevent disclosure—and a right of
privacy. Statutory copyright has, since then, subsumed the common law right within
the larger rubric of copyright ownership,222 which, as we have seen, arguably has
more of the characteristics of property ownership.223 One might imagine that 120
years from now the privacy rights associated with some of the personal information
that comprises one’s digital identity will have grown into something closer to a
property right in one’s identity, and there are certainly forces pushing in that
direction, but it has not happened yet.
One might also consider whether the emergence of “identity theft” laws224
disproves this thesis.225 If something is capable of being stolen, and if one can
remedy the theft, does this not imply that it was owned in the first place?226 The
answer is likely no, and the proof is in the more ancient laws against fraud.227
Fraudsters have been around for a very long time, and have run out of town on rails
when they are uncovered.228 Persons who steal identity in the electronic age have
democratized fraud, and have brought the harm to bear more directly on the persons
whose identities have been misappropriated, but the crime is essentially the same.

Id. at 205.
Id. at 200–04.
221 See Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U.S. 182, 188 (1909) (“At common-law, the
exclusive right to copy existed in the author until he permitted a general publication. Thus, when a
book was published in print, the owner’s common-law right was lost. At common-law an author had
a property in his manuscript . . . .”).
222 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
223 See 17 U.S.C. § 201.
224 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1028.
225 See generally Jennifer Lynch, Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Crime Control Methods and
Their Effectiveness in Combating Phishing Attacks, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 259, 259–60 (2005)
(explaining that phishing e-mails ask the recipient to verify personal information on a fake website,
acting as the real business with the real account, in order to “steal her identity,” suggesting that the
identity was owned in the first place).
226 Bergelson, supra note 30, at 404. Bergelson acknowledges that despite the name “identity
theft,” what the laws “really aim at is future crime (e.g., theft, fraud) the commission of which is
facilitated by identity theft.” Id. She points out that as long as there is no “intent to commit [a]
future crime, an unlawful use or transfer of identifying information does not constitute a theft of
identity,” which suggests that the identity of a person is not truly owned. Id.
227 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Boynton, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 77, 79 (1806) (finding defendant
liable for common law fraud for counterfeiting the signatures of a bank president and cashier).
Naturally, this is long before any identity theft laws were in place, yet pretending to be someone,
albeit through signature, was still unlawful. Id.
228 See MARK TWAIN, HUCKLEBERRY FINN, ch. 17 (The Duke and the Dauphin).
219
220
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And, in effect, it proves my point: You cannot make yourself into somebody that you
are not, and you cannot prevent people from knowing who you are.

III. SOME MODEST PROPOSALS
The collection and exploitation of PII continues to attract intense legislative and
regulatory attention. The Appendix to this article catalogues bills pending in the
U.S. Congress alone as of November 2012. Many dozens of bills are pending in state
legislatures across the country, and the Information Commissioners of Europe
proliferate their own interpretations, and re-interpretations, of the European
Directives and implementing legislation.229
Recent initiatives of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the White
House bear special mention. The White House published a White Paper in February
of 2012, proposing a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, enforceable industry codes of
conduct, effective enforcement by the FTC, and global harmonization of privacy
laws.230 In March of 2012, the FTC published its Report entitled “Protecting
Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change.”231 The Report proposed a “Privacy
Framework” comprising three elements: “Privacy by Design,” “Simplified Choice,”
and “Greater Transparency.”232 For the most part, the FTC’s framework was
consistent with the White House’s “Bill of Rights.” Both call for greater individual
control, transparency, simplified choice, improved security, and a reasonable
connection between the information collected and the context in which it is
collected.233 The FTC also recommends enactment of “Do not Track” legislation that
would provide consumers a means of preventing behavioral tracking.234
If one were to risk an overgeneralization, the FTC and White House proposals
are, in comparison with their European counterparts, more concerned with education
of consumers as to how their information is collected and used and less with limits
over the actual collection and use of the information. This is, of course, consistent
with the more laissez faire attitude that the United States takes to commerce in
general.235 It also, though, reflects the underlying reality that the collection and
exploitation of personal data in the United States ran well ahead of the public’s
understanding of it,236 whereas in Europe the EU Directive both educated the public
229 To catalogue all the pending legislation, regulations and initiatives would convert this essay
into a compendium.
230 THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK
FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 1–3
(2012) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE WHITE PAPER].
231 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
232 Id. at vii–ix.
233 See FTC REPORT, supra note 231, at vii–ix; WHITE HOUSE WHITE PAPER, supra note 230, at
1–2.
234 See FTC REPORT, supra note 231, at 4. Do-not-track bills were filed in both the House and
Senate in 2011. See Appendix.
235 Jack Ewing, U.S. Growth is Tepid, but It’s the Envy of Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/28/business/global/28iht-econ28.html?_r=0.
236 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1502 (2000).
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at an earlier date and restrained some of the most aggressive marketing efforts one
commonly sees in the United States.237 Nevertheless, services like Amazon,
Facebook, and Twitter that depend on the exploitation of personal data for their
commercial success are hugely popular on both sides of the Atlantic.238
The White House and FTC got it about right to the extent that they emphasize
education over control. For many, Internet commerce is like visiting a foreign
country, where the customs and etiquette are new and often disconcerting. To
complicate matters further, the inhabitants of this country are making up their
customs as they go along, and the pace of innovation, particularly in the realm of the
collection and use of PII, has outpaced the development of shared expectations as to
what is acceptable and what is not. A great deal of mischief has been caused by the
tendency of companies like Amazon, Facebook, and Twitter to be cagey about their
collection and exploitation of PII, leading to surprise and outrage when the facts
come to light.239 To the uninitiated, they seem to have put their feet on the table
during dinner without first considering alternative postures or begging the pardon of
their dinner mates. In a sense, these companies and their customers are making up
a new culture as they go along, and it is not at all surprising that the process causes
considerable anxiety and misunderstanding.240 A guidebook, with information about
what to expect in terms of the collection and use of personal information, is
important. Many of the recommendations of the FTC’s framework and the White
House’s Bill of Rights can be understood and applauded in this context.
There is, however, a risk of regulatory over-reaction to this collision of cultural
expectations. Thanks to the collection of personal information and the assembly of
digital identities, consumers obtain better, more personal service than would be
possible without it.241 Consumers can be spared many irrelevant advertisements
with which they would be bombarded, commercial television-wise, if the information
were not collected, and in the end, it is the exploitation of such information that
makes so many free Internet services possible.242 The assembly of such information
both creates enormous new wealth for the companies that compile it and facilitates
economic activity for all the other enterprises that take advantage of the
information.243 One does not want to kill the goose laying these golden eggs.244
See Chertoff, supra note 213.
See Pingdom Team, The Top Countries on Facebook, ROYAL PINGDOM (Aug. 12, 2010),
http://royal.pingdom.com/2010/08/12/the-top-countries-on-facebook-chart/.
239 See, e.g., Tony Romm, Kindle Fire Sparks Lawmaker Privacy Worries, POLITICO (Oct. 16,
2011, 6:53 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/65978.html.
240 See Natasha Singer, U.S. is Tightening Web Privacy Rule to Shield Young, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2012, at A1. This report indicates that public complaints regarding misuse of children’s
information have prompted the FTC to move “to overhaul” the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act in order to expand the scope of information subject to parental consent requirements. Id.
241 William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1114–15 (2009).
242 See id. (discussing Google, which is a free website, and its paid search advertising based on
a user’s search inquiries or on the content of a user’s email exchanges).
243 Ann Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization, and Gender, 34 U.S.F. L. REV.
633, 647–48 (2000).
244 The recent about-face by the U.K. Information Commissioner on the subject of cookies
exemplifies avoiding the risk of over-reaction. See Charles Arthur, Cookies Law Changed at 11th
237
238
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Beyond the economic risk, and from the author’s parochial standpoint as an
intellectual property lawyer, one must consider whether proposals for the creation of
new property rights in personal data can be reconciled with long-established
principles of intellectual property law that define the public domain. Without a rich
source of raw material in the public domain, the creation of new inventions and
works of authorship would be curtailed.245 Surely no one imagines that an individual
should be able to prevent an author from using facts about the individual’s life to
create a biography, but how does one distinguish this from the assembly of a digital
identity by a company like Amazon? The biographer, like Amazon, wants to use the
information for her own benefit and to sell the information to third parties to earn a
profit. Can one make a reasoned distinction between the two activities? In a sense,
Amazon’s activity is more benign, because it is quite unlikely to use the information
in a way that would offend the individual. Furthermore, if there are “bad facts”
about an individual—that he doesn’t pay his debts, that he has committed fraud—
should he be able to suppress this information because it is his “property”?
This inquiry brings one to an area in which regulation seems appropriate. There
are compelling public policy reasons why certain types of information should not
inform certain decisions. Race and religious affiliation are perhaps the most obvious
examples. Making decisions about the extension of credit, employment, housing,
lodging, transport, access to health services, and other universal needs on the basis of
race or religion is, and should be, illegal.246 This is not because an individual owns
the fact that she is of a particular race or religion; it is because discrimination on the
basis of race or religion is heinous for more general social and historical reasons.247
On the other hand, it is obvious that some products and services are more
appropriately advertised to members of a particular religion or race, and maintaining
such information for this purpose provides a valuable service—one probably does not
want to try to sell crucifixes to Muslims, and Muslims would probably prefer to be
spared crucifix promotions. In other words, it is the use of such information, not its
assembly and distribution, that merits legal control.
We come then to a modest proposal: Wherever possible, regulate and provide a
remedy for the potential misuse of PII as opposed to its assembly and benign
exploitation. Section 604(g) of the FCRA is an example of such regulation.248 It
generally prohibits service providers from obtaining and using medical information

Hour to Introduce ‘Implied Consent,’ THE GUARDIAN (May 25, 2012, 7:22 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/may/26/cookies-law-changed-implied-consent.
The
Information Commissioner had adopted regulations that, on their face, would have required prior
consent before any cookie could be placed on an individual’s computer. Id. This would have made
use of the Internet enormously inconvenient, as each visit to a website would have to have been
treated as a first visit as if one were required to pretend one did not know someone one had met
many times before. Id. Under pressure from industry the Commissioner relaxed the regulations to
permit Internet interactions to proceed more “normally.” Id.
245 A. Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public Domain in Intellectual Property Law, 25
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 11 (2002).
246 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012) (proscribing housing
discrimination specifically).
247 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954).
248 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(g) (2012).
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in connection with any determination of the consumer’s eligibility, or continued
eligibility, for credit.249 On the other hand, the statute contains no prohibition on
creditors obtaining or using medical information for purposes that are not connected
to a determination of the consumer’s eligibility, or continued eligibility for credit.250
One can imagine myriad purposes for obtaining such information, not the least of
which is the provision of effective medical treatment.
The FCRA takes this a step further in placing the burden on Consumer
Reporting Agencies—companies in the business of assembling credit-related
information—of policing the limitations on the use of the Consumer Reports they
assemble and sell.251 This approach, which has withstood some forty years of
enforcement and development and supports a highly viable industry, could be
generalized to include all aggregations of PII that contain information capable of
misuse. To use the analogy made earlier in this paper, such aggregations can be
considered a modern form of “dangerous instrumentality.”252 Like dynamite, they
have many viable purposes, but the person creating and selling these aggregations of
PII should bear responsibility for policing their potential for misuse.
This rationale extends as well to laws and regulations placing responsibility on
the data aggregators for unauthorized disclosure and for correcting erroneous
information upon notice from a consumer. In fairness to legislatures and regulators,
many existing and proposed regulations fall into these well-justified categories. One
such regulation is the proposed Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2011,253 which
would, among other things, require businesses possessing electronic data to establish
security procedures, and to have procedures for verifying and correcting the data.254
Another example is the proposed Data Security and Breach Notification Act of
2011,255 which would require security measures and notification in case of breach.256
On the other hand, proposed regulation that prohibits entirely the collection of
certain types of information, or permits it only with prior consent, seems
overbroad.257 For example, the proposed Geolocation and Privacy Surveillance Act of
2011258 and proposed Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011259 would both require
prior express consent to the collection of geolocation information.260 Another example
is the proposed BEST PRACTICES Act of 2011,261 which would among other things,

Id.
Id.
251 Id. § 1681(b).
252 See supra notes 175–179 and accompanying text.
253 H.R. 1841, 112th Cong. (2011).
254 Id. § 2.
255 S. 1207, 112th Cong. (2011).
256 Id. § 3.
257 See Clair Cain Miller & Somini Sengupta, In Mobile World, Tech Giants Scramble to Get Up
to Speed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2012, at A1 (“[J]ust last week, European regulators warned Google to
amend its privacy policy that allows it to gather information about people across diverse Google
products, from Gmail to YouTube.”).
258 S. 1212, 112th Cong. (2011).
259 S. 1223, 112th Cong. (2011).
260 S. 1212 § 2; S. 1223 § 3.
261 H.R. 611, 112th Cong. (2011).
249
250
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require prior consent to collect sensitive personal information,262. It is not easy to
understand how or why a person can legitimately prevent people from knowing his
race or that he is walking through a particular mall at a particular time. These facts
would be obvious to everyone else in the mall. On the other hand, the use of that
information to, for example, rob his home when he is not there, seems legitimately
actionable. Again, it is the use, not the information itself, which deserves regulation.
Put another way, the appropriate question of public policy concerns use of the
information, not its ownership.

CONCLUSION
There is something fundamental at work in the tug of war over the ownership of
personal identity. On the one hand, everyone craves a measure of recognition; on the
other hand, we morbidly fear exposure. When Brandeis and Warren wrote their
classic article on privacy, photography was the new technology, and tabloid
journalism was apparently the new business method.263 They lived in Boston, a large
city by nineteenth century standards,264 and a person living there could probably
enjoy a measure of anonymity if he chose to. They saw the new technology and
journalism as a threat to that “right to be left alone” and reacted against it with high
Victorian umbrage.265
One imagines that if they had lived in a smaller place their expectations for
privacy would have been very much diminished. In small communities, everyone
tends to know quite a lot about everyone else, for better or worse. Some of this
knowledge is accurate; much of it is probably exaggerated through gossip and
hearsay, but it is an inevitable fact of small-town life.266 Indeed, it is one of the
reasons many people flee small towns when they can.267 In spite of Brandeis’s and
Warren’s perceived evils of photography and tabloid journalism, a measure of
anonymity could be found for many years after 1890 in a big country with big cities,
like the United States. Their concern was with what happens behind closed doors in
Id. § 103.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 82, at 195 (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical
devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops.’”).
264 Samantha Barbas, Saving Privacy from History, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 973, 983–844; see also
JOHN S. BILLINGS, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, VITAL STATISTICS OF BOSTON AND PHILADELPHIA
COVERING A PERIOD OF SIX YEARS ENDING MAY 31, 1890, at 1 (1895), available at
www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1890.html (reporting Boston’s population in 1890 at
448,477).
265 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 82, at 196 (“The press is overstepping in every direction the
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.”).
266 See A.G. Sulzberger, In Small Towns, Gossip Moves to the Web, and Turns Vicious, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at A1 (“In the small towns nestled throughout the Ozarks, people like to say
that everybody knows everybody’s business—and if they do not, they feel free to offer an educated
guess.”).
267 See id. (chronicling one woman’s strong desire to leave her small town after becoming the
subject of a negative and untrue internet posting that caused friends and family to alienate her).
262
263

[12:1 2012]

The Ownership and Exploitation of
Personal Identity in the New Media Age

35

peoples’ homes, not the question whether what one does outside of the home is
subject to scrutiny.268
Now, in the early twenty-first century, privacy law abounds in all the major
markets.269 And the reason is obvious: With the Internet there is no place to hide
and no place where one can be anonymous and still engage in commercial life at all.
People are somewhat shocked to discover that the Internet has made life in the
biggest city as claustrophobic as the smallest of small towns. Just as the butcher,
baker, and liquor store owner in a small town will know what consumers eat and
drink, will know how much of each, and can gossip freely about consumption habits,
and just as the members of a church or synagogue or social club will know an
uncomfortable amount about a person’s family and its travails, online vendors and
social networks will have and may even share a comparable volume of information
about a person.270
It is not clear that this is an altogether bad thing; on the contrary, as evidenced
by Facebook, Twitter, Foursquare, Pinterest, and myriad other social networking
sites, people actively seek it.271 Where, in the past, young people fled small towns to
find the anonymity of the big city, today they flee the anonymity of the big city to find
recognition in the small towns represented by their friends on networks like
Facebook.272 The difference is that Big Brother, in the person of the collectors of
online data, is watching in a way that was never the case in a small town. The same
personal information that binds friends becomes more dangerous in the hands of an
anonymous corporation or anonymous government agency that can exercise
enormous power over the individual.273
And so, regulation over the collection and dissemination of such information is
both appropriate and inevitable. If successful, it protects against misuse of a person’s
information, particularly sensitive personal information, and also protects against
the dissemination of false or misleading information about that person. Protection
against, and remedies for, misuse of personal information should not, however, be
confused with ownership of the collections of personal information that comprise
identity. This is because, by engaging in commerce or in social media, a person is

268 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 82, at 215 (“The general object in view is to protect the
privacy of private life, and to whatever degree and in whatever connection a man’s life has ceased to
be private, before the publication under consideration has been made, to that extent the protection
is to be withdrawn.”).
269 See supra Part I.B.
270 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE:
FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, at iii (1998).
271 Lim Yung-Hui, 1 Billion Facebook Users on Earth: Are We There Yet?, FORBES (Sept. 30,
2012, 10:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/limyunghui/2012/09/30/1-billion-facebook-users-onearth-are-we-there-yet/ (estimating how long it will take for Facebook to officially surpass one billion
users).
272 See Clive Thompson, I’m So Totally, Digitally Close to You, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at
MM42.
273 See, e.g., FTC Announces Settlement With Bankrupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding
Alleged
Privacy
Policy
Violations,
FED.
TRADE
COMMISSION
(July
21,
2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.htm.
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making himself known to others, and others deserve to know whom they are dealing
with in both personal and commercial affairs.274
Identity and the personal information on which it is built are thus inherently
relational in nature. It is the opposite of anonymity, and one cannot have it both
ways: You can achieve anonymity by refusing to interact with others, but once you
begin to interact, you necessarily lose your anonymity and gain an identity in others’
perceptions of you. At that point, your identity is not, and by necessity cannot be,
your private possession.

274 But see Assemb. 1844, 2011–12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (prohibiting California
employers from requesting their employees’ username and password to social media accounts, and
making it unlawful to discriminate against those who fail to comply).
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APPENDIX
BILLS PENDING IN U.S. CONGRESS AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 2012
Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011 (S. 799)





Would require commercial entities that use or collect data to implement
security measures to protect information and provide users with notice on
their collection practices
Entities must allow users to opt-out of collection of personally identifiable
information and unique identifiers and allow users to access and correct
data
Entities may collect only as much information as necessary to process or
enforce a transaction
Authorizes FTC and state AGs to enforce penalties

Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2011 (S. 913)


Gives the FTC the authority to propose and enforce standards of a Do Not
Track mechanism

Do Not Track Me Online Act (H.R. 654)


Gives the FTC the authority to establish online opt-out mechanisms for
users to prohibit collection or use of “covered information”

BEST PRACTICES Act (H.R. 611)




Advertisers must obtain expressed, written consent to collect “sensitive
information,” including race, ethnicity, sexual orientation and income
Requires opt-in consent before a company may disclose information to a
third party
Requires companies collecting personal data to disclose practices and explain
options to consumers in timely, easy to understand notices

Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2011 (H.R. 1528)




Would require entities to notify consumers that their personally identifiable
information may be used for a purpose unrelated to the transaction
Entities would be required to establish a privacy policy, make it readily
available to consumers and notify consumers about changes in their privacy
policies
Entities must give consumers ability to opt out of the sale or disclosure of
their information to any organization that is not an information-sharing
partner

Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act (S. 1212)


Would prohibit companies from collecting or sharing geolocation information
without user consent
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Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011 (S. 1223)


Would require covered entities to offer prior notice and obtain expressed
consent from consumers in order to track and collect GPS information

Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011
(S. 1011)



Would update the ECPA to restrict third-party access to GPS information
Would require authorities to obtain a warrant before accessing an
individual’s e-mail, digital communications or geolocation information

Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2011 (S. 1207)



Requires businesses and NPOs that store personal information to implement
reasonable security measures and alert consumers when data has been
compromised
In the event of a breach, affected individuals would be entitled to free credit
monitoring for two years

Data Breach Notification Act of 2011 (S. 1408)


Requires federal agencies and persons engaged in interstate commerce in
possession of personally identifiable information to provide notice for any
breach of such information

Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011 (S. 1151)


Would require financial firms, retailers, and federal agencies to guard
private information, investigate possible breaches, and notify consumers if
their information may have been compromised

Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act of 2011
(S. 1535)




Would require interstate companies that handle PII on 10,000 or more U.S.
persons to provide notice and remedies to consumers in the event of breach
Holds companies accountable for preventable breaches
Enhances criminal and civil penalties against unauthorized collection or use
of PII

SAFE Data Act (H.R. 2577)



Would require businesses to notify consumers and the FTC within 48 hours
of containing and assessing a breach
Would entitle affected consumers to two years of free credit monitoring

Digital Accountability and Trust Act (DATA) of 2011 (H.R. 1841)




Would require FTC to create regulations requiring businesses that own or
possess electronic data containing personal information to establish datasecurity practices and procedures
Authorizes FTC to require a standard method or methods for destroying
obsolete non-electronic data
Requires information brokers to submit their security policies to the FTC in
conjunction with a breach or on FTC request
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Requires FTC to audit security practices of information brokers in the event
of a breach
Requires information brokers to establish procedures to verify the accuracy
of information that identifies individuals and to allow consumers to access
and correct data

